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Race and Equality Across the Law
School Curriculum: The Law
of Tax Exemption
David A. Brennen
What is the relevance of race to tax law? The race issues are apparent when
one studies a subject like constitutional law. The Constitution concerns itself
explicitly with such matters as defining rights of citizenship, allocating powers
of government, and determining rights with respect to property. Given the
history of our country-with slavery followed by periods of de jure and de
facto racial discrimination-these constitutional law matters obviously must
have racial dimensions.
Tax law, however, does not generally concern itself explicitly with matters
of race. Tax law is often thought of as completely race neutral in that its rules
do not explicitly hinge tax consequences on matters related to race. In fact,
even though the Internal Revenue Code refers to discrimination based on
nonrace factors twenty-six times,' it expressly' refers to the concept of racial
discrimination only twice, once with regard to racial discrimination by taxexempt social clubs3 and once with regard to the foreign tax credit for
taxpayers that participate in international boycotts that promote racial discrimination.4 But despite the paucity of express racial references in the code
itself, there are a myriad of implicit racial issues in tax law that mostly concern

David A. Brennen is the Ellison C. Palmer professor of tax law at Mercer UniversityThis article is written in memory ofJerome McCristal CulpJr. I thank my wife, Kimberly Turner
Brennen, for her support during its preparation.
1.

The Internal Revenue Code refers to discrimination on the basis of financial status 19 times,
see [.R.C. §§ 45F, 79, 105, 117,120,125,127,129, 132,274, 401,408, 410, 411,413, 414, 415,
501, 505, 4976, 4980 (2004); international taxation 5 times, see I.R.C. §§ 168, 891, 896, 897,
3305 (2004); school location 1 time, see I.R.C. § 144 (2004); and availability of evidence I
time, see I.R.C. § 4980B (2004).

2.

By use of express or expressly, this article focuses on language contained in the text of the
Internal Revenue Code, not on the way words are interpreted by courts or agencies. For
instance, even though the language of section 501(c) (3) of the code does not expressly
prohibit racial discrimination by tax-exempt charities, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the term charitable in that section as essentially meaning "not discriminatory against black
people." See BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

3.

See I.R.C. § 501(i) (2004).

4.

See I.R.C. § 999(b) (2004).
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the federal tax imposed on individual income or wages.5 One well-known
example is the racial bias inherent in the marriage penalty as a result of a
combination of tax law rules and the lingering effects of slavery and postslavery
discrimination against blacks. Though teachers of tax law are often quite
familiar with this and with similar race issues related to the federal taxes
imposed on individual income and wages, few are as familiar with the many
ways in which race affects our understanding of tax laws that apply to organizations, particularly tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. This article focuses
exclusively on the law of tax exemption (familiarly known as "tax exempt
law"), attempting to explain many of the instances in which race 6 is relevant to
7
an understanding of this growing area of legal study.
This article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the longrunning examination of race in areas like constitutional law where it is
obviously linked. The second part turns to race discussion in tax law, demonstrating that much of the racial focus in tax law has been on race bias in federal
taxes imposed on individual income and wages. The third part outlines ways
in which race can be discussed in a particular area that has yet to receive a full
examination of race issues-tax exempt law. It shows that issues of racial

5.

For articles that discuss race and tax law generally, see Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford,
A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 751; Dorothy A. Brown,
Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: TheJoint Return, 54 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1469 (1997) [hereinafter Brown, Race, Class, and Gender]; Dorothy A. Brown, The
Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in Taxing America, eds. Karen G. Brown &
Mary Louise Fellows, 45 (New York, 1996); Karen B. Brown, Not Color- or Gender-Neutral:
New Tax Treatment of Employment Discrimination Damages, 7 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's
Stud. 223 (1998); Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of EmploymentRelated Child-Care Expenditures, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism 307 (1998); Laura Ann Foster,
Social Security and African American Families: Unmasking Race and Gender Discrimination, 12 UCIA Women's I.J. 55 (2001); Mary L. Heen, Welfare Reform, the Child Care
Dilemma, and the Tax Code: Family Values, the Wage Labor Market, and the Race- and ClassBased Double Standard, in Taxing America, supra, at 322; Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 Geo. L.J. 1571 (1996).

6.

Although this article focuses only on race, other critical perspectives on tax exempt law might
also be instructive. For instance, a provision that Congress enacted in 1976 prohibits race,
color, and religious discrimination by tax-exempt social clubs but does not prohibit gender
discrimination by these same organizations. See I.R.C. § 501 (i) (2004). Certainly, a critical
examination of this provision from a feminist perspective might reveal unacceptable gender
bias in it. For other discussions of gender bias in the tax law generally, see Anne L. Alstott,
Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
2001, 2004 (1996); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Legislator Named Sue: Re-Imagining the
Income Tax, 5 .1.Gender Race & Just. 289 (2002) [hereinafter Konihauser, A Legislator
Named Sue]; EdwardJ. McCaffery, Taxing Women 5 (Chicago, 1997).

7.

Tax exempt law is indeed a burgeoning area of study in law schools. Although there have
long been treatises devoted to the subject (see, e.g., Frances R. Hill & Douglas M. Mancino,
Taxation of Exempt Organizations (Valhalla, 2002); Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of TaxExempt Organizations (New York, 2003)), before 1995 there was no widely adopted casebook devoted to it. Between 1995 and 2003 there was only one casebook that focused
significantly, though not exclusively, on tax exempt law: James J. Fishman & Stephen
Schwarz, The Law of Nonprofit Organizations (New York, 1995). In 2003 three new casebooks
dealing exclusively with tax laws affecting tax-exempt organizations were published: Nicholas
P. Cafardi & Jaclyn A. Cherry, Tax Exempt Organizations: Cases and Materials (New York,
2003);JamesJ. Fishman & Stephen Scbwarz, Taxation of Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and
Materials (New York, 2003); Darryl K. Jones et al., The Tax Law of Charities and Other
Exempt Organizations: Cases, Materials, Questions and Activities (St. Paul, 2003).
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discrimination, racial diversity, and racial perspectives might inform and
improve certain aspects of tax exempt law. The article concludes that the
expansion of legal scholarship and law teaching about race to such neutrallooking areas as tax exempt law can provide opportunities for discovery of new
and likely better visions of tax law.
Racial Bias in the Law Generally
In his 1991 article, "Toward a Black Legal Scholarship,"Jerome Culp takes
a broad look at critical race theory and posits various ways in which discussions
of racial justice can be injected into the law school curriculum and legal
scholarship.8 Importantly, Culp's article articulates the relevance of a black
perspective in law, that is, an approach to law-whether it be law making or
legal analysis-which entails questioning what law would be like if black
people played a more significant role in its creation or interpretation. For
example, Culp imagines a Constitution and a Declaration of Independence
written not only by whites (founding fathers and slave owners), but also by
blacks (former slaves). Among his conclusions is that the original Constitution, as written and without the many amendments that followed, would
probably not have been devoid of references to the history of black people as
slaves in America if blacks had played a more significant role in its creation.
Instead of a constitution that completely ignores the effects of slavery, Culp
imagines, we would have one that fully reflects the interests of all citizens,
explicitly referencing the deleterious impact of slavery on all of society. The
essence of Culp's important work is that a black perspective in law necessarily
leads to a different and socially more just legal environment.
Culp concludes his article by suggesting that tax law-like constitutional
law-could be explored through a "colored" lens, possibly leading to new
conceptions of justice and fairness in tax law. As he explains by means of a
hypothetical conversation with his mostly white faculty colleagues:
There may be a income tax problem that would benefit from being viewed in a black
perspective, but until you look, how will anyone know? To what extent have our tax
laws been distorted now and historically by the question of slavery and continuing

racism? Certainly taxation issues were included in the constitutional concerns
about how slaves as property would be treated.9

According to Culp, even an area of law as apparentlydevoid of racial bias as tax
law might look different if viewed critically from a black perspective. This does
not mean that every tax law rule would necessarily change after critical race
analysis; obviously, blacks and nonblacks have many of the same interests and
desires. Culp simply means that a critical race analysis of tax law, as with all law,
may reveal different visions of the law at places that might necessitate a
different structure of specific provisions. But without such analysis these
different visions may never become apparent.

8.

Jerome McCristal Culp Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 Duke LJ. 39.

9.

Id. at 101.
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Racial Bias inTax Law
In 1996, responding to Culp's suggestion that the concept of "black legal
scholarship" be applied to tax law, Beverly Moran with coauthor William
Whitford wrote an insightful article examining the code from a "black perspective."" In "A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code," Moran offers
an empirical analysis of social science data on race, income, and wealth to
demonstrate the existence of racial bias with respect to four categories of tax
benefits: wealth and wealth transfer benefits, home ownership benefits, employee benefits, and marriage benefits. As Culp imagined a constitutional
convention including blacks, Moran imagines a black Congress and demonstrates that federal tax laws might be structured differently had blacks played a
significant role in the creation of these laws. The differences would likely
result from the intimate familiarity of black congresspersons with the perspective of black people in America. Like Culp, Moran recognizes that her hypothetical black Congress might have adopted some tax law provisions that look
no different from those adopted by the mostly white actual Congress. But her
analysis demonstrates that there are some areas of tax law that blacks have no
interest in" or that are biased against blacks, even when one controls for
nonrace socioeconomic factors such as income. Though Moran cautions that
a black Congress would not act solely in the interests of black people and
would not be solely motivated to minimize taxes imposed on blacks, her black
Congress metaphor effectively highlights a type of unconscious racism in
certain aspects of American tax law.' 2
Later, in 1997, Dorothy Brown wrote a fascinating article that focuses on
the different impact of the federal income tax laws on black women as
compared to white women. "Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax
Literature" examines three aspects of federal income tax law that adversely
affect black families: thejoint-return provisions, the exclusion from income of
the value of services contributed by wives to their households, and the limited
deductibility of childcare expenses. 3 Prior scholars had intimated that these
provisions of federal income tax law adversely affected women because women
were "marginal wage or secondary earners. " Scholars generally drew conclusions of gender bias from the salient fact that the typicalhousehold consists of
a husband who is the primary wage earner and a wife who makes less as a
10. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 5. Although many have challenged the application of
critical race theory to tax law (see, e.g.,james D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Crits,
76 N.C. L. Rev. 1687 (1998); Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76
N.C. L. Rev. 1521 (1998)), critical race perspectives in tax law are indeed valuable. Notable
examples are Beverly Moran's and Dorothy Brown's work exposing the marriage penalty as
not only gender biased but also race biased. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 5;Brown,
Race, Class, and Gender, supra note 5.
11,

See Moran & Whitford, supra note 5, at 752-53 ("[A] Congress oriented solely to the interests
of blacks would never have perceived the original wrong that income averaging was intended
to cure.").

12. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
13. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender, supra note 5, at 1477.
14. Id. at 1471.
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secondary wage earner. Brown uses empirical data to show that black households are not necessarily typical: black families are more likely than white
families to have households in which the wages of husband and wife are
roughly equal. And the gender bias literature that does not take account of
race perpetuates the masking of race that Culp warns about.
The common theme among these examinations of race bias in federal tax
law is their focus on how some specific provisions for determining an individual's
federal wage and income tax liability tend to adversely affect black people.
These critical race scholars take the current structure of the tax law and seek
out instances in which that structure is biased against blacks. They do not
argue that the biased aspects of tax law are proof that the members of
Congress who enacted them were racists or that they purposefully discriminated against black people. Moran does not claim that the Internal Revenue
Code is evidence of actionable racial discrimination by Congress. Nor does
Brown claim that Congress intended to disadvantage black households more
than white households when it enacted the joint-return provisions of the code
in 1948. These scholars are simply bringing to light aspects of apparently
neutral federal tax law provisions that have a biased impact on black taxpayers
as compared to white taxpayers.
Race Issues in Tax Exempt Law
Another approach to examining race in tax law is to focus on issues of race
pertaining to organizations that are exempt from the federal income tax. Tax
exempt law is a subfield of tax law that focuses on the exemption from the
federal income tax for corporations, trusts, and other entities (as opposed to
individuals) that comply with certain statutory requirements. 15 Tax-exempt
organizations typically are charitable organizations, social welfare organizations, labor organizations, business leagues, social clubs, various beneficiary
associations, certain insurance companies, cemetery companies, credit unions,
employee benefit plans, and many more. The common link is that all of these
organizations are not required to pay federal income tax so long as they abide
by the relevant tax exemption rules. Tax exempt law consists of laws that
enable tax-exempt organizations to maintain their nontaxable (i.e., taxexempt) status. Instead of focusing so much on the relative fairness (or
unfairness) of a particular tax benefit as it affects blacks and whites, the race
bias focus in tax exempt law is more on the justness (or unjustness)-with
regard to blacks-of the statutory requirements for tax exemption.
This different focus in tax exempt law allows for a rich jurisprudential
analysis of tax law. Indeed, one of the primary advantages of conducting an
activity through a tax-exempt organization is that such activity automatically
receives public and governmental financial support through tax expendi-

15. The exemption statute, quite succinctly, provides: "An organization described in subsection
(c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such
exemption is denied under section 502 or 503." I.R.C. § 501 (a) (2004).
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tures. " Scholars and judges disagree about the constitutional implications of
government financial support by means of tax expenditures (tax benefits) as
opposed to direct expenditures (direct outlays of cash)." But few could deny
that many tax-exempt organizations receive a financial benefit from the
government as a direct result of their tax-exempt status. The indirect financial
support from government means that tax-exempt organizations often avoid
many of the political aspects that accompany direct government spending.
The uniqueness of tax exempt law issues, as compared to many issues that
arise in individual income tax law for example, provides an opportunity to
analyze tax exempt law and ask: How should the government allow tax-exempt
organizations to use this indirect, but admittedly financial, government/
public benefit?
There are many ways in which racial issues present themselves in the field
of tax exempt law. One major area-indeed, an area Culp alludes to in
'Toward a Black Legal Scholarship"--involves examination of the Bob Jones
University public policy doctrine and its application to racial preferences by
tax-exempt charities."8 Given the current state of constitutional law doctrine
concerning racial preferences,19 the issue of whether tax exempt law's public
policy doctrine affects the ability of charities (private universities, for example) to engage in race-conscious affirmative action or award race-dependent scholarships to blacks is of paramount importance.20 In addition to the
public policy doctrine, other racial issues include whether a charity's board of
directors should be racially diversified if it is to represent a broad cross-section
of the public that the charity serves2 and whether the current statutory
16. Tax expenditure theory essentially provides that the legal effect of certain tax benefits should
be analyzed as if the government had provided the recipient of the tax benefit an equivalent
grant of money. David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice and Civil Rights:
Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 167, 208-09 (2001). For a detailed discussion of tax expenditure theory, see Stanley S.
Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures 6-7, 30-49 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1973); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 1-30 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1985); see also Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544
(1983).
17. See generally Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50
Hastings L.J. 407, 411 n.20 (1999); Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally
Equivalent to Direct Expenditures? 112 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 380-81 (1998); see also Tex.
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 43 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("[]n other contexts we
have suggested that tax exemptions and subsidies are equivalent. We have not treated them
as equivalent, however, in the Establishment Clause context ... ." (citations omitted)).
18. See Culp, supra note 8, at 101; Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(declaring that, because racial discrimination violates established public policy, a tax-exempt
charity that discriminates against blacks is not entitled to 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt status).
19. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
20.

See David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Constitutional
Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law's Public Policy Limitation for Charities, 5
Ha. Tax Rev. 779 (2002) [hereinafter Brennen, Charities and the Constitution]; David A.
Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy, and "Charity" in
Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 389 (2000); David A. Brennen, Race-Conscious
Affirmative Action by Tax-Exempt 501 (c) (3) Corporations After Crutter and Gratz, 77 St.
John's L. Rev. 711 (2003) [hereinafter Brennen, Race-Conscious Affirmative Action].

21.

Compare Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the
Boardroom Quell Corporate Corrnption? 77 St.John's I. Rev. 837 (2003).
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prohibition on racial discrimination by tax-exempt social clubs should be
expanded or otherwise changed." Finally, in addition to racial discrimination,
tax exempt law presents an opportunity to address race in the context of tax
exemption rules that, though generally applicable to all tax-exempt organizations regardless of race, might look different if viewed through a "colored"
lens. For example, some of the rules pertaining to political campaigning by
tax-exempt charities (such as black churches) and tax-exempt charities that
conduct community development activities (such as redeveloping blighted
portions of an inner city) might look different if viewed from a critical
race perspective.
RacialDiscriminationby Tax-Exempt Charities
Of the many types of income tax exemptions described in the Internal
Revenue Code, by far the most cherished is the tax exemption allowed for
charitable organizations. At its most basic level, that exemption is the statutory
relief from the obligation of a charitable organization to pay tax on annual
income. Like all tax exemptions, this relief is granted pursuant to federal law
and is given automatically to those organizations that apply for and are
granted "charitable" status." But unlike just about all other tax-exempt organizations, charitable organizations receive special treatment as a direct result
of their tax-exempt status. For instance, with few exceptions, charities are the
only tax-exempt organizations that are also eligible to receive charitable
contributions from the public that entitle the donor to federal income tax
benefits. Individuals and corporations that donate money or property to
charitable organizations may be entitled to receive a tax deduction when
computing their own individual income tax liability. The potential deduction
can be quite significant depending on the amount of the donation, the type of
property donated, the income of the donor, and the type of charity to which
the donation is given. This ability to receive tax-deductible donations from the
public is a key federal tax law distinction between charities and other taxexempt organizations.
In addition to being excused from the requirement to pay tax on annual
income, the charitable tax exemption opens doors to a variety of other
economic and noneconomic benefits. Among the economic benefits are
relief from the requirement to pay federal unemployment taxes, access to taxexempt government bonds, and eligibility for preferred postal rates. In addition to these direct economic benefits, tax-exempt charities are also eligible
for many indirect economic benefits granted by state and local governments,
including state and local income tax exemptions, state and local sales tax
exemptions, and local real property tax exemptions.
A charitable organization must abide by many obligations to secure and
maintain its tax-exempt status. The obligations stem directly from the tax law
provision that authorizes the tax exemption for organizations performing
22. See I.R.C. § 501(i) (2004) (prohibiting racial discrimination by tax-exempt social clubs).
23. "Charitable" organizations are often referred to as 501(c) (3) organizations, a reference to
the section of the code which authorizes the income tax exemption for charities.
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charitable activities. To be granted a charitable tax exemption, an organization must be
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition . .. , or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation... , and which does not participate in, or intervene in
*
. , any political24 campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
for public office.
This statutory requirement imposes several affirmative and negative obligations on tax-exempt charitable organizations. Affirmatively, a tax-exempt charity
must show that it is both organized and operated primarily for a proper
charitable purpose. Negatively, a tax-exempt charity must avoid private inurement, cannot receive more than an insubstantial amount of private benefit,
cannot engage in more than an insubstantial amount of legislative lobbying,
and is prohibited from engaging in any political campaign activity.
The charitable purpose requirement is at the heart of the charitable tax
exemption, imposing an obligation on the charity to have a special type of
mission focus as opposed to a profit focus. The mission is distinctly different
from the mutual-benefit mission of the many noncharitable tax-exempt organizations. The mission that constitutes a proper purpose for the charitable tax
exemption must be what is collectively referred to as a charitable purpose.
Some of these purposes are specifically delineated in the statute that authorizes the charitable tax exemption-religious and educational, for example.
But many charitable purposes have to be gleaned from the statute by either
the Internal Revenue Service or reviewing courts. Some purposes that have
been recognized as "charitable" include providing relief to the poor, protecting the environment, combating community deterioration, providing homes
for the elderly, and improving health. 5 All of these specifically recognized
charitable purposes have at least one thing in common: they all seem to
impart some benefit to the public. In fact, the requirement to provide a public
benefit is integral to the many scholarly theories ofcharitable tax exemption.26
24. See I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (2004).
25. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1(d) (2) (2004); see alsojones et al-, supranote 7, at
129-65.
26. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 501 (1990); Rob
Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis,
and Syntheses, 27 Stetson L. Rev. 395 (1997); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale LJ. 299
(1976); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23J. Corp. L. 585 (1998); NinaJ. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax
Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 419
(1998); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals:
Toward a Donative Theory, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 307 (1991); Mark A. Hall &John D. Colombo,
The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 Ohio St. LJ. 1379 (1991); Henry
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Tax, 91 Yale L.J. 54 (1981).
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A key question for the charitable tax exemption is how to determine
whether a particular purpose is "charitable" or not. One instance in which the
charitable purpose requirement can become conceptually difficult is when a
proposed charitable purpose violates the public policy doctrine-a doctrine
adopted by the Supreme Court and now incorporated into tax-exempt-charity
law. Pursuant to the public policy doctrine an organization that is otherwise
"charitable" will not be treated as such if it engages in acts that contravene
"clear" or "established" public policy. 7 The prototypical example of an instance in which the public policy doctrine would defeat charitable status is
racial discrimination against blacks. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed
the IRS revocation of charitable status for Bob Jones University, a nonprofit
religious school that discriminated against blacks in its admission policies.
Administering the public policy doctrine, as applied to racial preferences
against blacks, is not problematic. But the doctrine becomes much more
difficult to administer in other instances. For example, should the public
policy doctrine be applied in such a way as to deny charitable status to
organizations that make racial preferences in the context of affirmative action? Though the Supreme Court recently ruled that affirmative action may
be constitutional if race is one of many factors considered by a state actor,"8 it
also ruled that affirmative action is unconstitutional if race is a deciding
factor. 2 Thus, three tax exempt law issues that may be informed by a critical
race perspective on racial preferences in the tax law arena are the following.
" Are the constitutional law standards for permissible racial preferences by state actors exactly the same as the tax exempt law standards for determining what is consistent with established public
policy?
" If the tax exempt law standards are different from the constitutional law standards, how should they be defined?
* If the tax exempt law standards are not different from the constitutional law standards, how should one determine when a nonstate
actor (a charitable organization) has a compelling "state"-like interest that would justify a racial preference?
One approach to the issue of racial discrimination by tax-exempt charities
might be to say that the public policy doctrine prohibits all racial preferences
whether for affirmative action purposes or not. But how would this analysis be
altered if the racial preference issue were addressed by a hypothetical black
Congress? Asked differently, might a black perspective on this issue yield a
different legal result? A black perspective might suggest that, because racebased affirmative action aimed at benefiting society is meaningfully different
from invidious racial discrimination against blacks, tax-exempt charities should

27. Bobjones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("A corollary to the public benefit
principle is the requirement, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the purpose of a
charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established public policy.").
28. See Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
29. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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be permitted to engage in affirmative action even in the face of the public
policy doctrine.3"
Perhaps one reason for this potential issue respecting the legality of affirmative action by tax-exempt charities is the manner in which the tax law rule
aimed at combating discrimination-the public policy doctrine-was adopted
by the Supreme Court in BobJones University v. United States. The only tax law
issue involved in the case was whether a tax-exempt charity's discrimination
against black people necessitated denial of the benefits that flow from the
charitable tax exemption. But instead of creating a rule specific to invidious
racial discrimination, the Court in BobJones Universityadopted a broad neutrallooking rule that, on its face and in a manner consistent with the entire
Internal Revenue Code, does not even mention "race" or "discrimination."
That is, it adopted a facially neutral tax law rule that could conceivably apply
to any number of circumstances, some having to do with race and some having
nothing at all to do with race. In other words, instead of expressly attempting
to include the "black perspective and experiences" of marginalized applicants
to Bob Jones University in tax exempt law, the public policy doctrine masks
the racial dimensions of this area of law through adoption of an apparently
neutral tax law rule-the public policy doctrine.
RacialDiscriminationby Noncharitable Tax-Exempt Organizations
Another example of an attempted masking of race in tax exempt law is
Congress's adoption of a rule prohibiting racial discrimination by tax-exempt
social clubs,3" which do not enjoy many of the "special" privileges bestowed
upon tax-exempt charities. Tax-exempt social clubs are not eligible to receive
tax-deductible contributions, nor are they entitled to the many state and
nontax federal benefits reserved solely for tax-exempt charities. Nevertheless,
tax-exempt social clubs are entitled to federal exemption from the income
tax-so long as they comply with the statutory requirements contained in the
portions of the tax exemption law specifically applicable to them.
A tax-exempt social club is a club "organized for pleasure, recreation, and
other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are for
such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder."3 Many private golf and tennis clubs are organized as
tax-exempt social clubs so long as they comply with this definition. Many of
these clubs have been known to discriminate against women and minorities,
including blacks, and such discrimination continues even today. Responding

30. See Brennen, Charities and the Constitution, supra note 20; Brennen, Race-Conscious
Affirmative Action, supra note 20.
31. See I.R.C, § 501(i) (2004).
32. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (7) (2004).
33. One widely publicized example of a non-tax-exempt golf social club that continues to
exclude women is the Augusta National Golf Club in Georgia, home of the Professional Golf

Association's Masters Golf Tournament.

Journalof LegalEducation
to racial discrimination at social clubs, Congress enacted a tax law provision in
1976 aimed at prohibiting such invidious acts.34
Though this nondiscrimination provision is certainly a step in the right
direction toward prohibiting discrimination by tax-exempt social clubs, it
clearly lacks a black perspective. Its legislative history says simply: "In view of
national policy, it is believed that it is inappropriate for a social club or similar
organization described in section 501 (c) (7) to be exempt from income taxation if its written policy is to discriminate on account of race, color or
religion. ' 35 From a black perspective, one might wonder why this provision
applies only to social clubs. Does this mean that racial discrimination by other
tax-exempt organizations is permissible for tax law purposes? Although the
public policy doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Bobjones University
v. United States clearly prohibits racial discrimination by tax-exempt charities,
that doctrine applies only to tax-exempt charities. The Bob Jones University
public policy doctrine does not apply to the many other tax-exempt organizations described in the tax exemption statute.
Aside from the limited applicability of the nondiscrimination rule to taxexempt organizations other than social clubs, another race issue is why the
rule, at least textually, is so restrictive. Indeed, the textual expression of the
rule applies only to discrimination contained in a tax-exempt social club's
written documents (the charter, bylaws, or other governing instrument, or any
written policy statement). Does this mean that official and authorized discrimination by words or actions of key members of a tax-exempt social club
cannot cause the organization to lose its federal tax exemption? This limited
applicability to written documents is very different from the much broader
public policy rule for tax-exempt charities, which presumably seeks out discrimination wherever it exists. A hypothetical black Congress today (or even
in 1976 for that matter) would most certainly adopt a statute very different
from the one actually adopted as a nondiscrimination rule for tax-exempt

34. See Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697. The statutory provision that
prohibits discrimination by tax-exempt social clubs provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), an organization which is described in
subsection (c) (7) shall not be exempt from taxation under subsection (a) for
any taxable year if, at any time during such taxable year, the charter, bylaws, or
policy
statement of
other governing instrument, of such organization or any uritten
such organization contains a provision which provides for discriminationagainst
of race, color,
or religion. The preceding sentence to the
any person on the basis
extent it relates to discrimination on the basis of religion shall not apply to-(1) an auxiliary of a fraternal beneficiary society if such society(A) is described in subsection () (8) and exempt from tax under subsection
(a), and
(B) limits its membership to the members of a particular religion, or
(2) a club which in good faith limits its membership to the members of a
particular religion in order to further the teachings or principles of that
religion, and not to exclude individuals of a particular race or color.
See I.R.C. § 501 (i) (2004) (emphasis added).
35. See S. Rep. No. 94-1318; 94th Congress, 2d Sess.; H.R. 1144 (1976).

Race and Equality: The Law of Tax Exemption
social clubs.5 6 A statute enacted by blacks would likely address discrimination
by the many other categories of noncharitable tax-exempt organizations besides social clubs and would likely address discrimination in various forms,
whether reflected expressly in written documents or not.
Racial Diversity on Tax-Exempt Charities'Boards
Another area of tax exempt law that could be influenced by a critical race
perspective concerns the composition of the board of directors of a taxexempt charitable organization. Steven Ramirez's article on federal corporate
law reform efforts aimed at lessening the likelihood of corporate scandals like
those at the start of the millennium posits that a racially diverse board of
directors would make such scandals less frequent. According to Ramirez,
cultural and racial diversity on corporate boards "could enhance small group
decision-making processes and diminish the inclination of small groups to
devolve into a groupthink approach to issues." 7 He explains that groupthink
causes small groups, like boards of directors, to mindlessly adhere to group
norms and fail to challenge or question group decisions. Cultural diversity,
which includes racial diversity, on corporate boards tends to discourage
groupthink and reduce the risk of inappropriate decision making such as that
at Enron. Though this racial diversity approach has been used in other
countries in reforming corporate law rules, the United States failed to do so in
its legislative response to the many corporate scandals that plagued American
corporations.
Although Ramirez's assertions about the value of racial diversity on forprofit corporate boards are aimed at improving corporate financial performance, similar assertions about the value of diversity can be made without
reference to the financial bottom line. Is there a value in diversity that does
not depend on showing a financial or economic interest? Such claims about
the noneconomic value of diversity can be made with respect to for-profit
corporations but may not have as much force in a profit-motivated institution.
The same is not true, however, for tax-exempt organizations-specifically, taxexempt charitable organizations. Because tax-exempt charities are mission
driven and not profit driven, the value for them of racial diversity must
necessarily be linked to something other than financial return. In fact, taxexempt charities are legally prohibited from improperly passing on organizational profits to shareholders or members. The beauty of tax exempt law with
respect to race is that the race issues are not necessarily subject to being
compromised by concern for the financial bottom line."
Federal tax law does not contain any express provisions concerning laws
generally applicable to boards of directors of tax-exempt organizations-a
36. Another obvious issue here is the noticeable absence of any mention of gender discrimination. Would a feminist approach, or for that matter any other approach to legal analysis that
represents the interests of a marginalized segment of society, endorse a nondiscrimination
law in this context that does not prohibit gender discrimination?
37. Ramirez, supra note 21, at 839.
38. The lack of a legal concern for profit does not mean that tax-exempt charities do not care
about money. Like all nonprofit organizations, they must ensure that they have sufficient
revenues to pay bills and, if appropriate, expand operations.
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matter left primarily to state law. But tax exempt law does require that the
organizational structure of a tax-exempt organization be such that the organization is driven to accomplish its tax-exempt mission." This requirement is
most prevalent with respect to tax-exempt charitable organizations. Two major concerns regarding the structure of tax-exempt boards that make tax
exempt law open to a racial analysis are the requirement that board members
avoid reaping improper financial benefits from the organization and the
requirement that the board represent a broad cross-section of the community
the organization serves.
Federal tax law prohibits tax-exempt charities' board members from receiving organizational profits except as beneficiaries or as fair compensation for
products or services delivered to the charity by, or on behalf of, the particular
board member. A board must constantly ensure that all transfers of money or
property between the organization and a board member are consistent with
this prohibition on improper private benefits. Ramirez's article on racial
diversity's tendency to lessen the occurrence of groupthink on corporate
boards suggests that a racially diverse tax-exempt charitable board would be
less likely to engage in prohibited private benefit transactions. The idea is that
a more diverse board creates a culture of scrutiny that encourages board
members to speak out whenever improper activities occur. Accordingly, while
racial diversity does not guarantee that improper private benefits will not pass
from the tax-exempt charity to individual board members, it might lessen the
likelihood of such improper deals. Ramirez's assertion with respect to forprofit corporate boards is that Congress made a mistake in not including a
racial diversity mandate for corporate boards in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. A critical race perspective on tax exempt law might indicate that taxexempt charitable boards, even more than for-profit corporate boards, would
likewise benefit from a racial diversity mandate.
Tax exempt law sometimes requires that a tax-exempt charity's board of
directors represent a broad cross-section of the community served by the
charity. 40 This requirement is most exemplified in the context of the private
foundation rules applicable to tax-exempt charitable organizations. A private
foundation is a tax-exempt charity that either fails to serve certain specified
charitable purposes or fails to demonstrate that it has appropriate levels of
public financial support. Unless a charity serves certain educational, religious,
medical, public safety, or governmental purposes, it must demonstrate that it
receives substantial financial support from a wide array of public sources to
39. In the wake of the many corporate corruption scandals that have plagued the for-profit
corporate environment, tax exempt law and nonprofit corporate law are beginning to focus
more closely on specific corporate governance issues. See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine et al.,
New EO Focus-The Board Compensation Committee, 43 Tax Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 265,
265-71 (2004). The American Law Institute has also instituted a project ("Principles of the
Law of Nonprofit Organizations," Evelyn Bi ody, reporter) that is focused, in part, on legal
issues specific to boards of directors of nonprofit organizations.
40. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a
hospital that does not have an emergency room open to the poor may still qualify as
charitable so long as it, among other things, has a diverse board. Id. See also Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-9(e) (3) (v) (1973) (relating to private foundation status for tax-exempt charities).
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avoid private foundation status. To satisfy the substantial financial support
requirement, a tax-exempt charity must show either that it receives more than
one-third of its support from a variety of public sources or that it receives more
than ten percent of its support from these sources and satisfies other factors.
Among the other factors is that the board of directors represent a broad crosssection of the community.41
Because it does not specifically state that racial diversity is required (or even
contemplated) with respect to either the rules that limit private benefits or
those that require a charity board to represent a broad section of the community, tax exempt law presents an opportunity to consider race. We might ask:
To what extent might these two aspects of tax exempt law (prohibition of
private benefits and broad cross-section of community) benefit from a race
perspective? Should tax exempt law require, or at least urge, tax-exempt
charities to have racially diverse boards in some cases? Further, should tax
exempt law apply a racial diversity mandate for all tax-exempt organizations,
not just tax-exempt charities? This article is not intended to answer these
questions; it merely raises the issues. But, as Culp might say, how will we ever
know if there is a race issue with respect to these aspects of tax exempt law
unless we look through a colored lens?
OtherAreas That Might Benefit from a Black Perspective
There are many other possibilities for legal education to consider race in
the context of tax exempt law. Broadly speaking, many of these other areas
involve looking not so much at explicit notions of racial discrimination or
racial diversity, but more generally at how different structures of law affect
certain racial populations. For instance, religion is a big part of the black
experience and has been since the time of slavery, so laws that affect taxexempt black churches might have a special impact on the black community.
Consider the rule that prohibits tax-exempt charities, including churches,
from performing political campaign functions for political candidates.42 It is
not uncommon for black churches to allow political candidates, especially
those candidates who advocate the interests of black people in particular, to
speak from the pulpit. Even though the no-political-activities prohibition is a
41. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (A) (i-vi) (2004), Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3)(v) (1973). The "broad
governing body" requirement provides:
The fact that an organization has a governing body which represents the
broad interests of the public, rather than the personal or private interests of a
limited number of donors . . . will be taken into account in determining
whether an organization is "publicly supported." An organization will be
treated as meeting this requirement if it has a governing body ... which is
comprised of public officials acting in their capacities as such; of individuals
selected by public officials acting in their capacities as such; of persons having
special knowledge or expertise in the particular field or discipline in which
the organization is operating; of community leaders, such as elected or
appointed officials, clergymen, educators, civic leaders, or other such persons
representinga broad cross-section of the views and interestsof the community, or, in the
case of a membership organization, of individuals elected pursuant to the
organization's governing instrument or bylaws by a broadly based membership.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e) (3) (v) (1973) (emphasis added).
42. See I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (2004).
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neutral-looking provision, a black perspective on this rule might result in a
different interpretation of it to reflect the particular interests of black peopleor even result in a different rule.
Another example has to do with tax-exempt charities that engage in community development activities. A community development organization is a
tax-exempt organization formed to develop areas of a community that are
often blighted or otherwise subject to severe deterioration. Specifically, an
organization formed for the purposes of relieving poverty, eliminating racial
or ethnic prejudice, lessening neighborhood tensions, and combating community deterioration in economically depressed areas is entitled to taxexempt charitable status. To accomplish these purposes, community development organizations often involve partnerships between government and private developers (or other private interests) formed to provide funds to businesses and individuals who are not otherwise able to get funds because of the
financial risk associated with operating in depressed communities or because
of their minority or disadvantaged status. Charitable tax exemption granted to
community development organizations could present an opportunity to explore tax exempt law's ability to recognize the uniqueness of being black in
America. For example, the Internal Revenue Service has historically limited
the community development tax exemption to organizations that "relieve
poverty, eliminate prejudice, reduce neighborhood tensions, and combat
community deterioration."4 A race analysis of this aspect of tax exempt law
might ask whether the law should permit a community development organization to exist if its only objective is to "eliminate discrimination" in a particular
area of a community?

Issues of race pervade American law-not just constitutional law, but all
law. If the aim of law is to seek out justice, it only makes sense that legal
education provide an opportunity to study the racial and nonracial aspects of
law with an eye toward correcting any injustice. Many injustices-again, racial
and nonracial-are explicit and apparent. Many other injustices, though, are
hidden from plain view. As Jerome Culp has pointed out, racial injustices are
often so well hidden that it takes a special type of "vision," indeed a special
type of experience, to discover them. Though many steps toward exposing
race bias in tax law have been taken, there is still much work to do. Here, as in
other aspects of American life, we still have a long way to go in stamping out
the vestiges of slavery. A critical race examination of tax exempt law will get us
just that much closer to achieving this laudable social justice goal.

43. See Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162; Rev. Rul. 81-284, 1981-2 C.B. 130.

